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Abstract:
Philosophy has repeatedly denied cinema in order to grant it artistic status. Adorno,
for example, defined an ‘uncinematic ’ element in the negation of movement in
modern cinema, ‘which constitutes its artistic character ’. Similarly, Lyotard
defended an ‘acinema ’, which rather than selecting and excluding movements
through editing, accepts what is ‘ fortuitous, dirty, confused, unclear, poorly
framed, overexposed ’. In his Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou embraces a similar
idea, by describing cinema as an ‘ impure circulation ’ that incorporates the other
arts. Resonating with Bazin and his defence of ‘ impure cinema ’, that is, of cinema’s
interbreeding with other arts, Badiou seems to agree with him also in identifying
the uncinematic as the location of the Real. This article will investigate the
particular impurities of cinema that drive it beyond the specificities of the medium
and into the realm of the other arts and the reality of life itself. Privileged examples
will be drawn from various moments in film history and geography, starting with
the analysis of two films by Jafar Panahi: This Is Not a Film (In film nist, 2011),
whose anti-cinema stance in announced in its own title; and The Mirror (Aineh,
1997), another relentless exercise in self-negation. It goes on to examine Kenji
Mizoguchi’s deconstruction of cinematic acting in his exploration of the geidomono
genre (films about theatre actors) in The Story of the Last Chrysanthemums
(Zangigku monogatari, 1939), and culminates in the conjuring of the physical
experience of death through the systematic demolition of film genres in The Act of
Killing (Joshua Oppenheimer et al., 2012).
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Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realise
it was missed.
Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (1973)
Theodor Adorno wrote these at once disillusioned and auspicious lines
in the mid 1960s, a moment where philosophy seemed at odds with
its time after having disastrously failed to prevent two world wars; but
it still continued to exist, albeit, in his view, unaware of its own
obsolescence. In a similar vein, Alain Badiou has more recently remarked
that philosophy is affected by malaise due to what he terms a
‘delocalisation ’: ‘ it either strives to graft itself onto established
activities – art, poetry, science, political action, psychoanalysis and so
on – or merely passes over its own history, becoming a museum of itself ’
(2008: 3). In this chapter, I will appropriate Badiou’s idea of
‘delocalisation ’ and focus on film, and film philosophy, in order to
identify the places where political thought may continue to thrive after
historical failures and manmade catastrophes. My purpose will be to
capture the moment where films from different corners of the globe
suggest ways of transforming thought, and society along with it. My
method will consist of an enquiry into whether cinema itself, having been
oblivious of its several deaths as it wandered over different technical
supports in its centenarian existence, would still be alive and able to
contribute to social change. Rather than looking at the effects of these
technical supports on the cyclical deaths and revivals of cinema, I propose
to think along the lines of ‘non-cinema’ by looking at instances in which
the medium disregards its own limits in order to politically interfere
with the other arts and life itself. Because he was the first to intuit what
I am calling here ‘non-cinema’, my approach will inevitably revolve
around Andre´ Bazin and his philosophical contribution to film studies.
I will start by recalling the title of Bazin’s foundational oeuvre, Qu’est-ce
que le cine´ma?, or What is Cinema?, which continues to resonate in the ears
of whoever proposes to study film. The ineffability of cinema, the near
impossibility of defining it, was for Bazin constitutional of the medium
and, his writings suggest, should be left unresolved, together with any
attempts at identifying its specificities. Bazin’s most devoted disciple and
erudite specialist, Dudley Andrew, however, has recently dared to provide
an answer to the question, and indeed an emphatic one, ending with an
exclamation mark: What Cinema Is! (2010). Andrew’s answer attempts, in
the first place, to reframe and update the old dispute fuelled by Bazin
between a cinema of montage and a realist cinema based on time and
space uncut. To that end, he defends a cinema whose aim is ‘ to discover,
to encounter, to confront, and to reveal ’ (xviii), the birth of which he sets
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at the end of the Second World War, when Italian neorealism inaugurated
what he, in tune with Bazin, calls ‘modern cinema’. Following in the
footsteps of his master also in positing modern cinema against what Bazin
and many others after him defined as a ‘classical ’ style reliant on montage,
Andrew extends the reach of the modern through the world new waves
of the 1960s and up to ‘ their consequences in our day ’ (xix). Though
reluctant to speak of a ‘classical ’ cinema in the digital age, Andrew takes
issue with whatever stands for it today, be it a ‘cinema of effect ’ in the
words of Sean Cubitt, a cinema of ‘ lies and acting ’ as summarised by
Lev Manovich, or ‘machines of the visible ’, which according to Jean-Louis
Comolli are aimed at engendering calculated viewer responses. Finally, he
sums up his idea of what cinema is with a provocative wordplay: ‘real
cinema has a relation to the real ’ (xxv). This tardy manifesto for a realist
cinema, whose terms might have sounded too vehement even for the
realist champion Bazin, evidently derives from a politics, a parti pris for
‘ the films some of us most care about, and consider central to the
enterprise of cinema in toto ’, in Andrew’s words. What exactly would this
politics be?
A mere claim for the ‘modern’ would be insufficient to explain the
possible political causes of a ‘real cinema’, in particular if modernity is to
be located as late as after the Second World War, when we know that, as a
historical phenomenon, it started with the industrial revolution in the
eighteenth century or even earlier. Bazin’s modernity, however, seemed
not only to disregard this fact, but also to reject the contribution made by
artistic modernism and the avant-gardes of the early twentieth century.
In fact, Bazin’s hailing of the modern, which for him encompassed projects
as radically different as Germany Year Zero and Citizen Kane, might be
simply understood as praise of the cinema of his own time. It moreover
coheres with his evolutionary idea of the seventh art, according to which
technical progress had no other purpose than to bring cinema closer to
the real.
This ‘real ’ for Bazin, however, was never a point of arrival, but an
interrogation mark. Indeed Bazin’s philosophical insights into realism,
scattered over his essentially journalistic work, lead us into different,
sometimes conflicting directions, among them, phenomenological (or, in
Bazin’s terms, ontological) realism, narrative realism and the reality of the
medium. Having addressed all these categories, Bazin was never really
concerned with providing clear distinctions between them, stating instead
that ‘what I normally call “realism” does not have any absolute and clear
meaning but rather designates a movement, a tendency towards a faithful
rendering of reality ’ (1971: 78). More significantly, all these realist modes
were part and parcel of a multifaceted world which kept cinema in
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permanent communion with what it was not: the other arts and real life.
This Bazin called ‘ impure cinema’ whose interrogation might allow us to
elucidate his politics of the real beyond the vagaries of modernity. Indeed,
the notion of impure cinema posits Bazin as a precursor of thinkers who
resorted to negative dialectics as a means to make a case for art cinema,
including the inventor of negative dialectics himself, Theodor Adorno,
the herald of postmodernism Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard and the ultra-leftist
philosopher Alain Badiou.
In what follows, I will take Andrew’s emphatic affirmation of ‘real
cinema’ as an invitation to reinstate the question mark to Bazin’s enquiry
into what cinema is, by placing his realist and impure cinema insights in
dialogue with the dialectical thought of our time, resulting in the idea of
non-cinema. I will then apply these concepts to the analysis of some key
elements of Jafar Panahi’s anti-cinema experiments; Kenji Mizoguchi’s
geidomono (film on theatre) landmark The Story of the Last Chrysanthemum
(1939); and Joshua Oppenheimer and co-directors Christine Cynn and
anonymous’s re-enactment of mass murder in The Act of Killing (2012),
in order to demonstrate how, at very different points in film history and
geography, cinema’s dissolution into other art forms and life itself results
in transformative politics.
Non-Cinema and the Politics of Realism
It is universally accepted that film, as a recording medium, entertains
an unmediated relation to objective reality, as opposed to other mimetic or
representational arts. Most definitions of cinema, however, emphasise the
ways in which it tears itself apart from reality by means of framing, scale
manipulation (resulting in the close-up) and montage, all techniques
aimed at eliciting narrative coherence and a mere ‘ impression’ of reality.
In the age of mechanical reproduction, Walter Benjamin tells us, the
simulacrum of cinema has no original (1999). Bazin, however, took the
opposite route by focusing on ontology, that is, precisely on the link
between cinema and the real world, regardless or even because of the
threat it posed to medium specificity. From this point of departure he
derived a philosophy of cinema which placed him in direct dialogue with
the main debates of his time and anticipated much of the progressive
thought of today.
Despite having bequeathed to film studies no philosophical
compendium, but instead thousands of journalistic writings, Bazin’s
philosophical aspirations are clear from his foundational essay, ‘The
Ontology of the Photographic Image ’, whose focus on ontology aligns it
with the traditional method of philosophical enquiry going back to Plato.
More pointedly, in choosing to start from ontology, Bazin was joining the
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phenomenological and existential turn of his time, spearheaded
respectively by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, whose
works engage with the legacy of Martin Heidegger. Ontology, a major
branch of metaphysics focusing on being and existence, is key to
phenomenology insofar as it deals with phenomena generated by the
encounter between consciousness and the material world. It is also at the
core of existentialism, a school which gives primacy to human existence,
as famously defined by Sartre:
Atheistic existentialism, which I represent… states that, if God does not
exist, there is at least one being in whom existence precedes its essence… a
being who exists before he can be defined by any concept of it. That being is
man, or, as Heidegger put it, the human reality. (2007: 22)
Bazin transposes this Sartrean idea literally to cinema, stating, in his
Impure Cinema essay, that ‘we must say of the cinema that its existence
precedes its essence ’ (1967c: 71). The reference here is to the public,
without which, in Bazin’s view, cinema cannot exist, like a house that ‘has
no meaning except as a habitation’ (71). Another way of understanding a
cinema that precedes its essence would however be as ‘pre-cinema’ or a
cinema which has not yet broken its umbilical cord with real life,
remaining instead in a permanent embryonic state, a small, inner circle
within a major outer container, reality, from which it sucks its life. Several
of Bazin’s statements would corroborate such a reading, not least his
understanding of the photographic image as the ‘transference of reality
from the thing to its reproduction ’ (1967a:14), a process enabled by the
medium’s automatism that places it in direct relation with the objective
world. In the ontology essay, this property is highlighted in order to
differentiate photography and cinema from the other plastic arts, however
it equally establishes cinema’s indissoluble link with them as well as with a
real world which lies beyond its limits. As we know, this early inkling of
indexicality, which in semiotic parlance means the material link between
sign and referent, was destined to become one of the most central concepts
in film studies. But it was also a first intimation of non-cinema, insofar as it
identifies cinema with reality only to demonstrate its insufficiency to fully
signify it.
In order to understand the reach of this mode of reasoning I would like
to refer to Adorno’s definition of dialects, in his late work Negative
Dialectics:
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not
go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to
contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction is not what
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Hegel’s absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it into: it is not of the
essence in a Heraclitean sense. It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact
that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. (1973: 5)
In a similar way, it was on the basis of an excessive quality of the objective
world that Bazin erected his pantheon of realist filmmakers. Indeed,
realism, for him, seemed to rely on that part of the film in which pro-filmic
phenomena surpass human will and control as exacted through the acts
of framing, selecting and cutting. Hence his unflinching defence of
the long take and the long shot, which, by virtue of being faithful to the
spatio-temporal continuity of the pro-filmic event, preserve these
uncontrollable traces of the real which appear to have a will of their
own. The defence of these devices means that, even though ontology, or
the automatic imprint of the real onto the film strip, is part and parcel of
cinema’s very nature, not all films are realist in Bazin’s view. Realist, in the
first place, are those filmmakers who demonstrate allegiance to this
element of chance by staying away from the manipulative process of
montage. Jean Renoir is one of Bazin’s favourite examples of realist
filmmakers precisely for this reason, and Bazin reports him as stating: ‘The
more I learn about my trade the more I incline to direction in depth
relative to the screen. The better it works, the less I use the kind of set-up
that shows two actors facing the camera, like two well-behaved subjects
posing for a still portrait ’ (Bazin 1967b: 34). Thanks to this preference for
the long shot, in Renoir’s films, according to Bazin, ‘ there is always a part
of chance in the discovery of the scene by the lens ’ as it conveys, through
depth of field, ‘ the continuity of the gaze through time, its unique
vanishing point in space ’ (1971: 81).
The act of relinquishing cinema’s property of fragmenting the action
through the cut is addressed by Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard with the fitting
name of ‘acinema’. In Lyotard’s understanding, cinema is a ‘crowd of
elements in motion’ which are candidates for selection and elimination. If
no movements are picked out, he says, ‘we will accept what is fortuitous,
dirty, confused, unsteady, unclear, poorly framed, overexposed’
(1986: 349). He places the intensity of these incongruous elements in
opposition to the law of value, which states ‘ that the object, in this case the
movement, is valuable only insofar as it is exchangeable for other objects
and in terms of equal quantities of a definable unity (for example,
quantities of money) ’ (350). Instead of a law which governs cinema on the
basis of a political economy aimed at productivity and consumption,
Lyotard proposes acinema, that is, the enjoyment of sterile moments
which ‘give rise to perversion and not solely to propagation’ (351).
Citing Adorno, Lyotard goes on to define the ‘only truly great art ’ as
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‘pyrotechnics ’, which ‘simulate perfectly the sterile consumption of
energies in jouissance ’ (351).
Bazin’s realist proposal would, at least partially, resonate with this
anti-utilitarian stance. For example, the disposable particles of the real
brought into the story by the lens’s automatism were not meant, in his
view, to corroborate the story, but to call attention to themselves and away
from the narrative thread. A 360-degree pan in depth of field, in Renoir’s
Boudu Saved from Drowning (Boudu sauve´ des eaux, 1932), for example,
rather than carrying the story forward, is aimed at revealing ‘the intrinsic
beauty of the banks of the Marne river, whose rich details are never
eluded’ (1971: 79). Phenomenological realism as obtained through
spatio-temporal continuity seems at times, for Bazin, so opposed to
narrative realism, that they risk cancelling each other out. He says: ‘one
could easily imagine … a film by Stroheim composed of a single shot as
long-lasting and as close-up as you like ’ (1967b: 27), going on to dream
with Zavattini of the ultimate realist film, consisting of ninety minutes of
the life of a man to whom nothing ever happens ’ (37).
As if following Bazin’s lead, many thinkers have defined ‘modern ’ or
‘art ’ cinema as the one constantly longing for its own dissolution in real
time and space. Though unaware of Bazin’s writing, Adorno, for example,
takes issue with Sigfried Kracauer who distinguishes cinema from
photography on the basis of added movement: the movement of the
objects in front of the camera, the camera movement itself and the
movement engendered by editing devices (1997: 33ff). Adorno contends
that such a theory is ‘both provocatively denied and yet preserved, in
negative form, in the static character of films like Antonioni’s La Notte:
Whatever ‘uncinematic ’ in this film gives it the power to express, as if with
hollow eyes, the emptiness of time. Irrespective of the technological origins
of the cinema, the aesthetics of film will do better to base itself on a
subjective mode of experience which film resembles and which constitutes
its artistic character. (1991: 180)
Similarly, uncinematic stasis, as opposed to cinematic movement, is
praised by Bazin in terms of ‘ life time’, or ‘ the simple continuing to be of a
person to whom nothing in particular happens ’, as he famously described
certain scenes of Umberto D (Vittorio De Sica, 1952), in which the
rendering of a character’s experience of time takes the upper hand over the
narrative (2005: 76). However, Adorno’s preoccupation was not at all with
the prevalence of the phenomenological over the subjective world, but
with the unavoidable ideological residues of the culture industry, as
symbolised by the quarrel between technology and artistic technique,
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which uncinematic stasis endeavoured to neutralise. As Miriam Hansen
reminds us, Adorno attributed to cinema a leading role in modern art,
but only insofar as it rebelled against its own status as art through
self-awareness of its technological origin (Hansen 2012: 218).
On the other hand, one would err in reading Bazin’s foresight of the
politico-philosophical virtues of non-cinema as a dismissal of narrative
illusionism, or the realism of the fable. As Tiago de Luca rightly points
out, the long take would become associated with dedramatising and
non-dramatic cinematic schools long past Bazin’s, and, for that matter,
Adorno’s time, as it takes place much more frequently in current world
cinema practices (2014: 21). In what may sound like a contradiction,
Bazin is in fact wary of films in which narrative is purposely disrupted
through the extended use of the long take and the long shot, ontological
though they might be. An example is The Earth Trembles (La terra trema,
Luchino Visconti, 1948), which he lauds for its long takes that allow us to
see ‘ the whole operation; it will not be reduced to its dramatic or symbolic
meaning, as is usual with montage ’ (2005: 43). But he goes on to blame
Visconti for running counter to ‘some filmic principles ’ and refusing ‘to
sacrifice anything to drama’. As a result, he says, The Earth Trembles ‘bores
the public ’ (45).
The ‘aesthetic impasse ’ that Bazin attributes to Visconti is no other than
his own, as he treads the thin line between the defence of a
phenomenological world that imposes itself over the filmmaker’s will
and the need for narrative without which there is no cinema – the story
being, in his view, a ‘filmic principle ’. Bazin’s attachment to the fable
was indeed notorious, not least in his hostility towards the modernist
avant-gardes, which he criticised, among other things, for their disregard
for narrative that undermined cinema’s popular vocation as mass medium.
One possible summary of Bazin’s realist formula would then be the
spatio-temporal continuity as enabled by the long take and the long shot,
which tends towards the sterile jouissance of non-cinema, that is to say,
life, which in turn finds itself constantly and necessarily limited by the
eventual victory of the cut – or the commercial economy of the fable.
More generally, Bazin’s politics was to do with history, or ‘historicity ’,
as stressed by Philip Rosen (2001; 2014), which can be verified, yet again,
in the ontology essay, when he compares photography with the process of
embalming, stating that in cinema, for the first time, ‘ the image of things is
likewise the image of their duration, change mummified’ (1967a: 15).
In defending a film such as Umberto D as ‘a truly realist cinema of time’, ‘a
cinema of “duration”’, Bazin was in effect seeking sanctuary in Henri
Bergson and his notion of dure´e through which his application of the
mummy complex to cinema could be philosophically justified. As Deleuze
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explains, for Bergson ‘past and present must be thought as two extreme
degrees which coexist within duration, the former of which is defined for
its state of distension and the latter, by its state of contraction’. As a result,
‘ the present is only the more contracted degree of the past ’ (Deleuze 2002:
39–40). By defining realism as a fable infused with, and diffused by,
chance encounters with incongruous elements of time and space, Bazin
was highlighting those moments where story becomes history. This is
precisely what his philosophical successor and Bergson follower Gilles
Deleuze was aiming to achieve by splitting cinema into movement-image
and time-image, across the axis of the overwhelming historical event of the
Second World War.
Non-Cinema and the Politics of Intermediality
Non-cinema is even more openly suggested by Bazin through his praise of
cinema’s mixture with other arts conveyed in the notion of ‘ impure
cinema’, a precursor of today’s trendy term of intermediality. This is one
of Bazin’s most complex and fascinating insights, which places him
alongside the most politicised thinkers of modernity, including, once
again, Adorno, who predicted that ‘film’s most promising potential lies
in its interaction with other media, themselves merging into film’
(1991: 183). The exclusive novelty of Bazin’s approach is however his
equating to realism those films which make apparent and rely upon
cinema’s mingling with other arts and media. Thus he defines as ‘realist ’
films which are not at all subservient to the phenomenological real,
but instead faithful to their theatrical or literary origins. For example,
he applauds Robert Bresson’s decision to film Diary of a Country Priest
(Le Journal d’un cure´ de campagne, 1950) by following the Bernanos
novel page by page, as this demonstrates his fidelity to the reality of
the original literary style on which the specificities of the fable rely
(1967c: 54).
Along the same lines, Bazin’s adherence to Sartre’s existentialism,
leading to his metaphorical statement that ‘cinema precedes its essence ’,
should be understood as cinema being more than what its specific
dynamic properties would allow it to be. This placed him on a collision
course with essentialist ideas of film as a self-sufficient medium, as
formulated by theorists such as Rudolf Arnheim, Be´la Bala´zs and Jean
Epstein, and cherished by the modernist avant-gardes of the 1920s. Bazin’s
very use of the term ‘cine´ma impur ’ was a direct response to the ‘cine´ma
pur ’ project, first launched by Henri Chomette and very much in vogue
during the 1920s and 30s among avant-garde and Dada artists and
filmmakers, such as Rene´ Clair, Man Ray and Fernand Le´ger. The adepts
of ‘cine´ma pur ’ proposed to draw exclusively on the techniques
The Location of Politics in Film
139
inherent in the film medium, such as movement, lighting, contrast,
rhythm and – most in conflict with Bazinian thought – montage. Such a
fascination with cinema’s technological artifice, tending towards complete
abstraction from figurative mimesis and narrative representation
(Chomette 1993: 372), could not be further removed from Bazin’s idea
of cinema as a ‘window on the world’, a realist vocation to which he
subordinated all technological progress.
Bazin’s anti-avant-garde convictions take him to the extreme of making
blatant errors of judgment, such as stating that ‘The Andalousian Dog
[Un chien andalou, Luis Bun˜uel and Salvador Dalı´, 1929], despite involving
multiple artists of incontestable talent, has aged much more than Griffith’s
Broken Blossoms [1919] ’ (1983: 225). However, the reverberation of his
revolutionary and farsighted understanding of cinema’s impure nature and
mission continues to be felt today, not least in philosophy. Unequivocally
drawing on Bazin, without ever quoting him, Alain Badiou, in his
Handbook of Inaesthetics (2005), for example, finds in the concept of
‘ impure cinema’ an alternative for reconnecting philosophy with the arts.
In a chapter entitled ‘The False Movement of Cinema’, a propos of Wim
Wenders’s film False Movement (Falsche Bewegung, 1975), he questions
cinema’s specific property of movement in the following terms:
Movement is the impure circulation that evolves within the totality that
comprises the other artistic practices. Movement installs the idea within a
contrasting allusion (which is itself subtractive) to arts that are wrested from
their proper destination. (2005: 79)
Badiou chimes with Bazin not only in establishing cinema’s indissoluble
link with the other arts, but also in making the very concept of cinema
insufficient to carve out a space in the art world for a self-sufficient
existence:
It is effectively impossible to think cinema outside of something like a
general space in which we could grasp its connection to the other arts.
Cinema is the seventh art in a very particular sense. It does not add itself to
the other six while remaining on the same level as them. Rather, it implies
them – cinema is the ‘plus-one ’ of the arts. It operates on the other arts,
using them as its starting point, in a movement that subtracts them from
themselves. (79)
In statements such as this, Badiou is replaying the dialectical mode of
reasoning I have described above a propos of Adorno and Bazin, which
places the concept (that is, cinema) in a subordinate relation to the thing
(that is, the other arts) in such a way that impure cinema becomes part of
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a wider totality that denies it a totalising status. At the heart of Badiou’s
theory of inaesthetics, including his view of cinema as ‘ impure
movement ’, is the proposal of an alternative to what he defines as the
three main schools of thought of the twentieth century: Marxism,
Heideggerian hermeneutics and psychoanalysis, all of which he deems
saturated. His proposal is that art is a truth procedure sui generis, both
immanent and singular (2005:10), which unveils itself through
‘variations ’ or ‘passages ’. In the case of cinema, and as exemplified by
Wenders’s False Movement, based on Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre,
this truth procedure is verified in the passage from one medium to
another: movement subtracting itself from film and turning into the novel
which subtracts itself from language, and so forth. Once again resonating
with Bazin and his defence of realism, Badiou identifies in the
transferences and dissolutions between media ‘ the very thing that will
have ultimately constituted the Real of the idea’s passage ’ (2005: 80).
But how does impure cinema, which becomes real insofar as it moves
away from itself, become political? In order to provide an answer to this
question, I propose to analyse three examples which cross the frontiers of
life and the other arts.
Between Real Life and the Other Arts
My first case study refers to a filmmaker who systematically refuses to
abide by the rules of cinema in the name of a politics of the real: Jafar
Panahi. Any of Panahi’s films could illustrate this hypothesis, but I will
start with This Is Not a Film (In film nist), shot in 2011, which embraces
the non-cinema dialectics in its own title. Confrontational and
self-reflexive to the core, the film was made in defiance of the Iranian
authorities, who had prohibited the director from making films and placed
him under house arrest. With the complicity of assistant Mojtaba
Mirtahmasb behind the camera, Panahi undertakes to secretly stage,
inside his house, the difficulties of his current situation. But he dislikes the
result and at a certain point decides to ‘remove his cast ’. The reference is
to the character of one of his early films, The Mirror (Ayneh, 1997), in
which the nine-year-old star, Mina, suddenly decides to abandon the
shoot. She throws away the cast from around her arm, which was part of
her character, changes into her normal clothes and sets out to find her way
back home by herself on foot. The film then cuts to the extract of
The Mirror where this happens, which is shown on Panahi’s TV set, after
which the director confesses to his feeling that he had been pretending
and lying in his own staging in his home. Addressing Mirtahmasb behind
the camera, he wonders whether this is a problem faced by all filmmakers,
prompting Mirtahmasb to confirm that he is currently involved in a film
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entitled Behind the Scenes of Iranian Filmmakers Not Making Films
and turning the self-denying effect of The Mirror into a specular
mise-en-abyme.
The film The Mirror itself, made when Panahi was still relatively free
as a filmmaker, demonstrates how his method had always been solidly
anchored on a real that clashes against and ruins the possibility of a
conventional film. For him, losing an actor does not mean losing a
character, and accordingly he orders the crew to continue to shoot,
profiting from the fact that Mina still has a functioning mic attached to
her. With the bus in which the team had been shooting they follow her as
she braves Tehran’s chaotic traffic in a similar way her character would
probably have done in the fictional story. She bumps into an old actress
who was part of the cast with her, in The Mirror, who reveals to Mina she
is as poor and lonely as the character she had been playing and spares no
criticism of the crew for the pittance she received for her job, casting
doubt on the director’s own good intentions. Mina goes on to hop into
a cab with other passengers, unwittingly recording the tirades of a
male-chauvinist driver against a feminist female passenger. She talks to
shop keepers, passers-by and policemen who have no will or means to
help a lost child, rendering a spontaneous and revelatory portrait of a
country and its society, whilst casting a critical eye over the very act of
filmmaking. In pursuit of the girl on their bus, the crew often lose sight of
her and, at times, also the signal of her mic. As a result, the film is a
collection of ‘what is fortuitous, dirty, confused, unsteady, unclear, poorly
framed, overexposed ’, a perfect Lyotardian non-film, but endowed with
the evidential quality and political power of the unembellished real. The
lack of a process of ‘selection and elimination’ defined by Lyotard as
inherent in the nature of cinema is evident here, leading to the loss in
commercial value highlighted in Lyotard’s formula. Indeed, despite
winning the Golden Leopard at Locarno in 1997, The Mirror never
found commercial distributors in Europe, having only recently become
available on DVD.
As for This Is Not a Film, now part of a trilogy including Closed Curtain
(Parde´, 2013) and the Berlin Golden-Baer-winner Taxi (2015), all made in
contravention of the filming ban imposed on Panahi, it ends literally with
the ‘pyrotechnics ’ Adorno and Lyotard describe as the ‘only truly great
art ’, as the director observes the fireworks celebrating the New Year
from behind the gate of his building that he and his film cannot trespass.
A self-consuming film is thus brought to light whose burning energy
momentarily prevails over an oppressive regime.
My second case study is the film The Story of the Last Chrysanthemum
(Zangiku Monogatari), directed by Kenji Mizoguchi in 1939, where realism
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and politics interweave in a completely different kind of non-cinematic
experiment. In the 1950s and 60s, Mizoguchi was lauded in the pages of
the Cahiers du Cine´ma by Bazin’s disciples, including Jean-Luc Godard,
Jacques Rivette and Eric Rohmer, for what they understood to be his
‘realism’, given his lavish use of long takes, long shots and tracking shots,
which, though mostly obtained within the four walls of a studio, were
deemed realist insofar as they preserved the spatio-temporal continuity of
the pro-filmic event. Deleuze has beautifully described the sociological
import of the phenomenological space in Kenji Mizoguchi created by the
combination of these three devices, through which the oppressed woman,
placed in the background, draws the man on to a ‘ line of the universe ’
(2005: 199). Curiously, however, Mizoguchi’s oeuvre is classified by
Deleuze under the category of ‘movement-image ’, hence alongside the
classical cinema of montage rather than modern realism, demonstrating
the limits of the diachronic division that denies access to modernity to the
most innovative procedures originating outside the history and geography
of Europe.
The Story of the Last Chrysanthemum in fact could not be more ‘modern’
in the way it testifies to non-cinema of the highest degree, thanks to a
self-reflexive structure which questions styles of performance for film, for
theatre and for both combined. The film is the adaptation of the novel of
the same name, a fictionalised biopic of Onoe Kikunosuke II, the actor
and stepson of one of kabuki’s most famous actors in his time, Onoe
Kikugoro V, situating the film within the geidomono genre. Geidomono are
films where the protagonist, male or female, is a practitioner of one of the
traditional Japanese arts such as kabuki, puppet theatre (bunraku) or
traditional dance (Sato 2008: 77). The genre was particularly resorted to
in the late 1930s as an alternative to governmental demands for
propaganda films, as the war efforts in Japan escalated. Mizoguchi’s
incursion into geidomono at that point was also a means of eschewing
governmental pressures, but it was no less an opportunity for him to
exercise his in-depth knowledge of Japanese traditional arts. He even
contemplated the possibility of casting the legendary actor Kikugoro VI,
the legitimate son of Kikugoro V, to play the role of his father in the film.
In an interview, Mizoguchi relates an interesting story about a meeting
with Kikugoro VI:
I went to the kabuki… and I met him [Kikugoro] in the backstage. ‘Today I
will perform in a cinematic way, pay close attention ’, he told me. Seen from
the audience, his performance appeared indeed different from usual, it was,
so to say, more realistic, with very natural and essential movements. (apud
Apra`, Magrelli & Pistagnesi 1980: 143)
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Mizoguchi goes on to say that he was not entirely convinced by the actor’s
delivery on that day due to the contrast it produced with the rest of the
cast, who continued to act in the traditional way. This episode is certainly
the inspiration for the astonishing opening of The Story of the Last
Chrysanthemum, showing precisely a moment of ‘bad acting’ by the young
Kikunosuke and performed by the famous shinpa (new theatre) and film
actor Hanayagi Shotaro. Sato reminds us that when Mizoguchi started in
the silent film era, using shinpa actors in the Nikkatsu Mukojima Film
Studio, they were still casting onnagata, or female impersonators, however
no close-up shots could be taken because, for example, their Adam’s apple
would show up (2008: 21). Now, Hanayagi does deserve a medium
close up at the beginning of The Story of the Last Chrysanthemum, as if
Mizoguchi wanted to make two statements: 1) this is cinema; 2) this is
good film acting, but bad acting for traditional kabuki. As a result, we,
spectators, feel that the actor’s acting is excellent and are puzzled to see it
repeatedly condemned in the film story as inadequate.
We then see Kikunosuke being expelled from his step father’s house,
due to his romance with his baby brother’s wet-nurse, Otoku. He leaves
for Osaka and leads a life of utter poverty as a lowly actor, alongside a
comsumptive Otoku. Towards the end of the film, however, Kikunosuke
makes a triumphal return to the kabuki house in Tokyo, having become
an accomplished actor at the expenses of his lover’s sacrifice. The film
then gives us a long kabuki scene, showing him in the famous female role
of Sumizome through a series of long shots and middle-range, often
semi-veiled, shots allowing the viewer scant access to the actor’s facial
features and actual performance. However, the sense of a real kabuki
theatre is conveyed in quasi-documentary long shots of the packed
auditorium. Once justified, kabuki’s artificial acting becomes cinema, but
only by also becoming uncinematic. At the same time, cinema’s ability to
produce scale reversal and the close-up, the main pillar of the star system,
is rejected, denying the actor the privilege of individual fame, whilst
placing theatre within its social context, that is, its audience, without
which it cannot exist. In becoming theatre, that is non-cinema, film
becomes political and exuberantly alive, amidst a cheering audience
within which the actor submerges, echoing that public Bazin so cherished
and found inseparable from any understanding of the film medium.
My last example fast-forwards film history to 2012 and one of the most
astonishing and disturbing films ever, The Act of Killing, directed by
Joshua Oppenheimer, Christine Cynn and another collaborator who had
to remain anonymous for safety reasons, as is the case for a great part of
the crew. The focus is the torture and murder of more than a million
alleged Communists, ethnic Chinese and intellectuals in Indonesia in the
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mid 1960s, on General Suharto’s order. The film undertakes the
re-enactment of these atrocities, utilising to that end not those on the
side of the victims, but unrepentant perpetrators, including gangsters and
members of Indonesia’s pro-regime paramilitary Pancasila Youth. These
former perpetrators, in particular Anwar Congo and Herman Koto,
fashion themselves after the image of their favourite Hollywood heroes
and genres in order to represent their crimes. This extraordinary choice is
explained by the fact that in the 1960s they were in the film distribution
business which was badly affected during the left-leaning Sukarno regime
they opposed. But because they are no professional actors and are entirely
foreign to movie making, their ‘films’ within the main film make them
appear as grotesque and involuntary parodies of themselves and their acts.
Thanks to this and to a constant Brechtian focus on the reality of the
medium, including the characters being dressed and made up in front of
the camera, the audible shooting instructions and the interviewer’s voice,
distanciation is elicited and spectatorial empathy prevented and replaced
by revulsion. However – and this is one of the several revolutions
accomplished by the film – the characters themselves seem increasingly
immersed in their roles to the point of identifying, in the classical
voyeuristic way, not only with themselves but with their victims as they
perform them and then watch the resulting rushes. The impression of
reality, as enabled by narrative illusionism, is here turned onto its head,
becoming the reality of life, or non-cinema. In a particularly bizarre scene,
both Anwar and Adi, his fellow executioner in 1965, play the role of
interrogators but with their faces made up in lacerated flesh, as if they
themselves had been tortured by the very interrogators they impersonate.
It is as if the death mask described by Bazin as comparable to cinema’s
ontological link to the material world had become alive and were being
applied to the faces of those pretending to be the killers, making the past
re-emerge in the present in its dure´e.
The extraordinary procedure Oppenheimer devised in order to achieve
this effect was to resort to one of the symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), from which Anwar is clearly suffering, which is
presentification. Sufferers from this disease are haunted by the feeling
that the traumatic event continues to happen in the present. This is
obviously the case of Anwar, who reiterates, in the film, that he continues
to be assailed by recurrent nightmares of the crimes he committed more
than 50 years ago. Alongside the reliving of the traumatic events, other
defining symptoms of PTSD are vivid flashbacks, intrusive memories and
images, and physical sensations such as nausea, which is at the core of a
key scene I will examine below. As Homay King reminds us a propos of
The Act of Killing (2013: 31), Sigmund Freud was the first to identify the
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symptoms of PTSD, which he described as ‘repetition compulsion’ in
patients suffering from traumatic neuroses, many of whom were war
veterans. Moved by the aim of unveiling a horrific past, The Act of Killing
attempts to bring back the dead from their graves and have them play a
role in the present through the very trauma their death has caused. Anwar
is nothing but an instrument to that end. In the process of presentification
and documentation of traumatic symptoms lies the extreme originality of
the re-enactment procedure utilised in this film, which rather than
resorting to archive photos or footage, conflates the past with the present
through the repetition of the act whose freshness and material reality is
preserved in the traumatic symptoms and abject bodies of their
perpetrators. Oppenheimer’s role as an infiltrator and treacherous ally of
the criminals is that of removing the mask of his subjects as well as his
own, in front and behind the camera, so as to attach the seal of material
truth to the irreparable act of killing whilst dragging the film away from
the realm of representation and into the present tense.
Vivian Sobchack (2004: 59) called ‘ interobjectivity ’ the process of
‘subjective realisation of our own objectivity, in the passion of our own
material ’, and the film is undoubtedly pushing its subjects to experience
themselves as objects. Viveiros de Castro, along similar lines, resorted
to the concept of ‘perspectivism’ to address an ethos among the
anthropophagic Tupi-Guarani, who incorporated both the strength and
the suffering of the warriors they devoured. Viveiros de Castro defined
this as ‘ the ability to look at oneself as the Other – a point of view
from which one arguably obtains the ideal view of oneself ’ (2005: 5).
It is not a coincidence that cannibalism is part of the horrors staged in
The Act of Killing, in a carnivalesque sequence which includes Herman
in drag forcing a severed penis and a slice of liver into the mouth of
the severed head of a victim, the latter being no other than Anwar
himself. In The Look of Silence (2014), a kind of sequel to The Act of
Killing made by Oppenheimer in order to provide the point of view of the
victims, perpetrators openly acknowledge the recourse to cannibalism – in
their case, to drinking the blood of their prey – as an antidote to the
haunting memory of their murderous acts. But The Act of Killing had
already provided a living testament to that process by adopting a
psychoanalytic procedure that turns cathartic identification into the reality
of acting, thus rendering palpable the agony of the victims as experienced
by those who were, at once, agents and privileged spectators of their
killing.
Two scenes placed at the beginning and the end of the film attest to its
political aim of forcing the perpetrators into the skin of their victims so as
to give them a physical sense of the plights they had caused. In the first
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one, Anwar, in a cheerful mood, visits a rooftop terrace which had been
the site of many of his thousand murders, in order to demonstrate how he
used a wire to strangulate his victims with a minimum spilling of blood.
In the second scene, Anwar revisits the same spot, but now, as the film
leads us to believe, after having gone through various re-enactments of his
crimes. As he attempts to convey the same description of the garrotte,
Anwar retches uncontrollably, as if he himself were being strangled and,
at the same time, regurgitating, though alas only symbolically, the bodies
of his victims. As the film has been entirely edited under the filmmaker’s
authorial authority – the evidence being the ‘director’s cut ’ version of the
film, on which this analysis was based – it is impossible to state with
precision the chronology of the events. Adding a decisive difference to the
second sequence from the first is, however, the use of a single long take.
Manipulative though it is, the film here opts out of a cinema of montage
that ‘selects and eliminates ’ movements, in Lyotard’s definition. As a
result, the retching is not edited out – and Oppenheimer suggests that
Anwar continued to perform, despite his sickness, probably in the hope
that this would be the case. The decision to preserve the long take in its
integrity is hence a political one, negating cinema in order to let reality
speak for itself.
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